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Introduction 
 
Human integrity owes its existence, at a deep level,  
to the patterns of approval and recognition. 
- Axel Honneth1 
 
Considerations of the causes of and correctives for social injustice are increasingly 
vital topics. Social recognition plays a vital role in both social injustices and efforts to 
overcome and prevent them. Axel Honneth’s influential accounts of recognition and 
struggles for recognition contain important insights into these topics. Unfortunately, some 
of Honneth’s concepts are narrow and need expansion for them to be useful in considering 
social injustices and responses to those injustices. This book presents important and, to my 
mind, necessary correctives and additions to Axel Honneth’s view of recognition to give 
the concepts of recognition, misrecognition, and struggles for recognition more explanatory 
power. I seek to address problems within recognition theory by clarifying the roles of 
misrecognition and struggles for recognition in human behavior. Rethinking misrecognition 
and struggles for recognition can lead to a more robust and relevant critical theory. 
Following Honneth and others, I accept that recognition is integral to individuals’ 
self-realization and to social justice, and I accept Honneth’s idea that struggles against 
injustice are often struggles for recognition. Those who seek justice seek not only material 
changes but also a change in their place in society. Workers striking for better pay and 
working conditions are also fighting for recognition of their needs, dignity, and moral right 
to just compensation for their labor. Women who have fought for the vote, property rights, 
equal pay, control of their bodies, and similar causes have been seeking a change in 
society’s recognition norms to include women as full members of society. The Black Lives 
Matter movement seeks not only the end of violence against blacks but also recognition as 
human beings. The movement’s name itself is an explicit appeal to recognition: They are 
seeking recognition that their lives also matter.  
Recognition has been cast by some, most notably Charles Taylor and Honneth, as 
public political struggles between social groups, but recognition is also at the heart of 
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interpersonal relations. Mutual recognition enables friendship, romantic partnerships, and 
other relations of care, but the guiding norms of recognition also facilitate less-personal 
relations by socializing us into our culture’s normative expectations for individuals’ roles 
and behaviors. The importance of recognition in individuals’ lives and in social justice 
movements makes it a vital element in social and critical theory. One of my main tasks in 
this book is to illuminate the foundational importance of interpersonal recognition in 
struggles for recognition. 
This study will begin with Axel Honneth, harvesting his insights to craft a foundation 
for understanding injustice and struggles against it. This study also builds on that 
foundation and goes beyond Honneth’s conceptualizations. It opens up new possibilities for 
critical theory by focusing on the vital social roles served by intersubjective recognition. A 
number of excellent scholars have put forward improvements to Honneth’s 
conceptualizations, and this study seeks to advance the study of recognition a step or two 
further with some friendly amendments and corrections to Honneth’s work. My goal is to 
enhance the understanding of recognition and misrecognition so they are more useful in 
diagnosing and correcting social injustices. To do this, we need to build on Honneth’s ideas 
and go beyond the shortcomings of those ideas to craft a new critical theory of 
interpersonal relations. 
Perhaps Honneth’s clearest summary of his project is this: 
Essentially, my idea amounts to the hypothesis that all social integration 
depends on reliable forms of mutual recognition, whose insufficiencies and 
deficits are always tied to feelings of misrecognition, which, in turn, can be 
regarded as the engine of social change.2 
Honneth has attempted to show that subjects’ experiences of misrecognition cause moral 
injuries, a psychological suffering that leads to feelings of moral indignation over having 
their intuitive notions of justice violated. Moral feelings of indignation are, Honneth 
claims, the motives for social resistance and rebellion that contribute to social change and 
moral progress.3 Honneth therefore calls for struggles for recognition to be the guiding 
 
2 Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange 
(London: Verso, 2003), 245. 
3 Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 131-139, 161-163. Axel Honneth, Disrespect (Cambridge, UK: 
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thread of critical theory.4 In his oeuvre, he has developed a critical theory linking 
subjective moral experiences of suffering, intersubjectivity, and normative intent that 
attempts to avoid structuralism and totalizing analysis.  
By “recognition” Honneth refers to “attitudes and practices by which individuals or 
social groups are affirmed in certain of their qualities.”5 There are two keys to Honneth’s 
concept of recognition. The first is that individuals are socialized into a lifeworld of 
recognition norms that denote what behaviors and contributions by human individuals 
should be honored and what behaviors should be censured. The second is that receiving 
recognition on the basis of these norms enables an individual to develop a positive relation-
to-self, his or her sense of place in society, and most importantly his or her autonomy to be 
able to determine and realize his or her own desires and intentions freely. Thus, individuals 
desire and need to both receive and give recognition to achieve their ends in society. For 
Honneth, justice is linked very closely to how, and as what, subjects mutually recognize 
each other and to what extent society’s relations of recognition support intersubjective 
relationships of mutual respect6 and grant all members of society the opportunity to 
participate in institutions of recognition.7 Thus, Honneth’s view of justice extends beyond 
the distribution of labor and the distribution of resources while including them in the 
quality of social relations and the personal integrity of all members of society.8  
A number of philosophers have criticized the concept of recognition in general and 
specifically Honneth’s use of it in social theory. To mention just a few: Nancy Fraser 
agrees with Honneth that recognition is central to critical theory but says Honneth has a 
monistic framework in which a properly differentiated account of recognition is all that is 
required for critical theory. She further charges that 
Honneth overextends the category of recognition to the point that it loses its 
critical force. Inflating that concept beyond all recognition, he transforms a 
limited but precise instrument of social criticism into a bloated and blunted 
catchall that fails to rise to the challenges of our time.9 
 
4 Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 144. 
5 Axel Honneth, “Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical Questions.” Inquiry: An 
Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 45 (4), 2002, 505. 
6 Honneth, Disrespect, 71, 130. 
7 Axel Honneth, The I in We, trans. Joseph Ganahl (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2012), 61. 
8 Fraser and Honneth, 177-183. 
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Lois McNay accuses recognition theory of binding agency too tightly to identity and 
relying on a reductive notion of power that neglects how social structures outside 
intersubjective interactions condition human experience.10 Danielle Petherbridge similarly 
argues that Honneth attempts to transform Foucault’s notion of power/struggle into a 
concept of recognition/struggle but that this move fails largely because he does not include 
an adequate account of power in his recognition theory.11 Patchen Markell criticizes 
recognition as an impossible and incoherent idea requiring a world of mutual transparency 
and invulnerable identities in which struggles for recognition are part of the problem rather 
than the solution of identity-based injustice.12 
Some of these critiques of recognition have merit, and I agree there are flaws in 
Honneth’s account; however, I still believe recognition is a highly useful concept if we can 
address its shortcomings. This study will amend recognition theory and answer some of its 
shortcomings through an analysis and rethinking of two important concepts: misrecognition 
and struggles for recognition. I believe that Honneth is correct about the importance of 
recognition in individuals’ lives, how the denial of recognition can motivate social 
resistance, and how that resistance can lead to normative change. I will show how 
Honneth’s conceptualizations of misrecognition and struggles for recognition are too 
general and therefore lack sufficient detail and clarity to explain social injustices and 
individuals’ responses’ to injustices. Despite the shortcomings in Honneth’s recognition 
theory, his voluminous writings provide us with a wealth of detail and insights on which I 
wish to build in directions that Honneth did not travel, attempting to illuminate how 
individuals experience recognition and misrecognition and how they struggle for 
recognition and justice.  
There are a number of aspects of Honneth’s large volume of work that I am not 
addressing in this book. I am not undertaking a genealogical study of Honneth’s 
philosophy, an extensive reconstruction of it, or an analysis of his historical and 
macrosocial theories. I am also not engaging in meta-questions about critical or social 
theory. My aim is to explore a particular set of questions and problems arising from 
 
10 Lois McNay, Against Recognition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008). 
11 Danielle Petherbridge, The Critical Theory of Axel Honneth (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2013), 
92-93. 
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Honneth’s work, attempting to solve them so as to provide a phenomenological foundation 
of misrecognition that can help shed light on the causes of injustice. I should also add that 
my focus is not on a “politics of recognition” or politics of misrecognition because I think 
that focusing on the experiences of individuals is the path to enhancing our understanding 
of social injustice. I will argue that thinking in terms of group identities is a contributor to 
misrecognition and injustice. 
This book is composed of two stand-alone but connected parts. In Part One, I critique 
Honneth’s account of misrecognition and provide an alternative view of misrecognition 
that replaces his account. First, I analyze ways in which Honneth’s accounts of recognition 
and misrecognition are insufficient, especially in terms of misrecognition. I critique 
Honneth’s argument for the separation of recognition into three modes—love, respect, and 
esteem/solidarity—and reveal problems with this division. Despite the internal logic of his 
typology, it does not help us to see clearly what is going on when individuals give or 
withhold recognition. His separation between legal respect as what unifies people under 
universal rights and social esteem as what differentiates people through distinctive traits 
does not dully consider the complexities and interconnections involved in legal and esteem 
recognitions. His restriction of love recognition to the family sphere fails to include the 
many forms and degrees that intimate relations can take and unduly separates it from 
solidarity. My analysis reveals that recognition can be described better as behaviors in 
which individuals and social institutions engage in varying degrees with recognition norms 
and with other individuals. I then reconstruct Honneth’s account of misrecognition, 
showing that he presents misrecognition as the contrary of recognition, which I argue is 
lacking in sufficient complexity and detail to describe the phenomena of misrecognition 
and individuals’ experiences of it.  
To build a more robust and fine-grained picture of misrecognition, I first critique 
Honneth’s typology of misrecognition as the contrary of recognition. Honneth is correct to 
understand that recognition is guided by social norms; however, it is not the case that 
misrecognition is always a violation of recognition norms. The social norms themselves 
may be at fault either in being intrinsically biased against some members of society or in 
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recognition is inadequately complex and fine-grained to describe recognition relations, then 
presenting misrecognition as the contrary of recognition within that typology will also be 
inadequately complex and fine-grained to describe the ways in which recognition relations 
can go wrong.  
To address these concerns, I develop a multidimensional view of misrecognition that 
replaces Honneth’s binary account of misrecognition as the contrary to recognition without 
replacing Honneth’s conceptions of the value of recognition. The dimensions I identify are 
the levels of engagement with recognition norms, with other individuals, and with action. 
The multidimensional characterization of misrecognition describes it as a varied 
phenomenon that is more than the contrary of recognition. Disengagement from social 
norms is misrecognition, but I identify forms of engagement with social norms that also 
lead to misrecognition and result in domination and oppression. One example is what I call 
“pathological recognition” in which the recognition norms are intrinsically biased and, 
though appearing to recognize individuals positively, in practice reduce those individuals’ 
social status and autonomy. “Normative discrimination” provides another example, 
denoting the engagement with a recognition order that designates social groups as having 
particular traits that should be negatively recognized. Lack of engagement with individuals 
includes a quotidian forgetfulness of others or deliberate and selective disengagement from 
others all of which result in misrecognition. I also identify ways that engagement with 
individuals can result in misrecognition. The action dimension of engagement in 
misrecognition is the level of action of the engagement with or disengagement from norms 
and/or other individuals. This multidimensional view allows for a more robust and fine-
grained account of what goes wrong in recognition relations leading to misrecognition and 
injustice. By replacing Honneth’s overly simplified account of misrecognition with a more 
robust, multidimensional account, we can address one weakness in recognition theory and 
better equip it to address its practical aims of diagnosing injustice.  
One complaint about the concept of recognition is that it is limiting and inflexible 
and maintains, if not creates, injustice and oppression. If recognition means conformity to 
homogeneity and ideological power structures, then recognition is at best problematic. It is 
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critics of recognition, but I will argue that these forms of “recognition” are distortions of 
recognition that are, in practice, pathological. This identification shows that much of the 
criticism of recognition is directed at pathological forms of recognition and, therefore, is 
actually criticizing injustices that are misrecognitions, for which healthy mutual recognition 
is the remedy. Pathological forms of recognition assume that identity is solely group 
oriented. As I will show, this assumption of group identity is inherently a misrecognition of 
individuals that leads to injustice.  
The injustices of the oppression of women, racial minorities, and workers are better 
understood, I argue, through the multidimensional view of misrecognition, which sees 
misrecognition behaviors along dimensions of engagement with norms, engagement with 
other individuals, and engagement with action. For example, within institutional racism are 
varieties of misrecognition behaviors and associated varieties of injustices suffered by 
marginalized groups that are revealed by applying the multidimensional view to individual 
behaviors. The multidimensional view of misrecognition opens up the complexities of 
social behaviors by appreciating the conflicts between recognition demands that individuals 
face and the ways social norms and individual involvements turn into behaviors of 
injustice.  
Part Two of this book is a critical examination of Honneth’s account of struggles for 
recognition—the emancipation from injustice. Honneth sees struggles for recognition as 
the driving force for historical change. I accept Honneth’s statement of the importance to 
critical theory of struggles for recognition, but if struggles for recognition are to be the 
“guiding thread of critical theory,”13 then he needs a fuller account of what is involved in 
struggles for recognition. To understand better how oppression and other injustices are 
resisted, and why often they are not, we need a revised account of struggles for recognition 
and their preconditions that correct some omissions in Honneth’s account. 
My critique of Honneth’s account of struggles for recognition identifies two 
problems: His premise that emotional experiences of misrecognition motivate struggles for 
recognition is contradictory without an account of individual agency, and his theoretical 
reliance on political resistance movements leaves out other paths that responses to injustice 
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can take. I propose the following solutions to these two problems: First, Honneth claims 
that experiences of injustice will motivate individuals to a struggle for recognition, but how 
can an individual, being damaged by misrecognition and lacking the recognition that 
Honneth says is necessary for one to be autonomous, have the capacity to struggle for 
recognition? To solve this dilemma, we need to include some conception of individual 
agency and responsibility in the undertaking of struggles for recognition. I incorporate the 
response model of recognition, Christine Korsgaard’s concept of self-constitution,14 
McNay’s interpretation of habitus,15 and insights from several other philosophers to give us 
a conceptual basis for how an individual could develop the oppositional consciousness to 
respond to experiences of suffering subjectively with a struggle for recognition within a 
cultural power structure. The ideas that individuals’ actions contribute to the constitution of 
their practical identities—composed of their roles, relationships, and membership in social 
groups—and that they can act out of that sense of self despite the misrecognition they 
receive from others, helps resolve the agency dilemma of how an individual undertakes a 
struggle for recognition. 
Second, I take issue with the tendency in recognition theory, not just in Honneth, to 
consider struggles for recognition predominantly as collective political movements for 
legal justice. I argue that Honneth incorrectly collapses interpretive structures that inform 
individuals that they are being treated unjustly with collective political movements against 
injustice. Although political struggles for recognition are the most accessible to social 
theory, considering only or predominantly such collective movements creates a lacuna that 
hides other forms and aspects of struggles for recognition. Most specifically, this 
theoretical view leaves out the very personal aspects that we can find in struggles for 
recognition. By decentralizing struggles for recognition from collective political 
movements and adding the concept of individual agency, we can craft a more robust picture 
of struggles for recognition. 
Instead of connecting struggles for recognition with political resistance movements 
as Honneth does, I argue there are two types of struggles for recognition:  
 
14 Korsgaard, Christine M., Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), Kindle locations 375-377. 
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 Affirmational: The ongoing efforts of individuals to seek recognition that 
constructs and affirms their personal identities and their place in society. 
Affirmational struggles attempt to fulfill human needs that are present prior to 
any particular social interaction and are the constant general condition of being 
a social individual. 
 Transformational: Responses to circumstances or instances of misrecognition 
that seek to rectify perceived injustices and restore healthy recognition 
relations. Transformational struggles attempt to fulfill needs caused by feelings 
of being misrecognized. 
The familiarity of continually needing to affirm one’s identity and social relations is a 
resource on which individuals can draw in engaging in transformational struggles against 
injustice. Placing these struggles in the context of social power relations and the 
multidimensional view of misrecognition clarifies how individuals respond to 
misrecognition with varying struggles for recognition.  
At the heart of the struggle for recognition is a struggle for authority, Cillian 
McBride observes16—a struggle over the authority and power to interpret and apply 
recognition norms. Struggles for power and authority over recognition norms and relations 
play out not only between social institutions and cultural groups but also intersubjectively 
among individuals and factor heavily in all interpersonal relations, including with whom 
we choose to have relationships. This insight is central to understanding how any 
individual responds to experiences of misrecognition—whether to acquiesce, withdraw, or 
undertake a transformational struggle. Individuals need an interpretive structure to 
understand the moral content of their experiences and what options of response are 
available to them. However, struggles for recognition are not limited to collective political 
struggles for legal rights or social esteem; they include struggles over identity, which, 
though they have personal, social, and political dimensions, are always struggles 
undertaken by individuals in the service of their own individual concerns. This 
understanding amends Honneth’s account by opening up other phenomena of individual 
responses to injustice. We can then see that some individuals form and join subcultures to 
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increase potential recognition relations, perhaps separating from others including through 
subcultural antagonism toward others and the self-recognition that I call “manufactured 
recognition.” 
Finally, I deal with another gap in Honneth’s theory (and social theory in general): 
the question of why, if experiencing misrecognition is a prerequisite for struggles for 
recognition, then how is it that anyone not so injured can join in solidarity with those who 
have been injured by misrecognition? Why did white people join the American civil rights 
movement; why do heterosexuals join same-sex marriage legalization movements; and so 
on? The answer to this gap is to understand that love recognition can extend beyond the 
family sphere where Honneth places it and that compassion for others can join with a 
rational understanding that others are being misrecognized. Our individual agency enables 
us to join others’ struggles for recognition, acts that are movements of recognizing other 
individuals and their transformational struggles as people and causes worth our time and 
energy.  
My expanded view of struggles for recognition takes it beyond identity politics and 
group political conflicts into everyday social experiences, expanding Honneth’s account. 
Collective social movements and the social changes they engender are best seen as arising 
from the dynamic social interactions among individuals who, in the context of their own 
lives, take action. Actions against injustice do not have to be political, organized collective 
action, and this is significant for social and political philosophy. The insights into struggles 
for recognition, combined with the multidimensional view of misrecognition, contribute to 
social theory with a set of conceptual tools that strengthen our understandings of how and 
why individuals contribute to injustices and respond to injustices. It also casts new light on 
political movements, social conflicts, and the dynamics of interpersonal relations. 
